Changes that cause changes
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Saari, Donald ; Merlin, Vincent R. |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 17.2000, 4, p. 691-705
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
-
The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Sertel, Murat R., (1999)
-
Indirect voting systems : Banzhaf numbers, majority funtions and collective competence
Berg, Sven, (1997)
-
The measurement of voting power : theory and practice, problems and paradoxes
Felsenthal, Dan S., (1998)
- More ...
-
A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule
Saari, Donald, (2000)
-
The Copeland method I; relationships and the dictionary
Saari, Donald, (1994)
-
Copeland method II; manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
Merlin, Vincent R., (1994)
- More ...