Chapter 12. Forecasters’ Objectives and Strategies

This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives, competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive literature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Marinovic, Iván ; Ottaviani, Marco ; Sorensen, Peter
Published in:	Handbook of economic forecasting ; Volume 2. - Amsterdam : Elsevier North Holland, ISBN 978-0-444-62732-2. - 2013, p. 690-720
Subject:	Reputational cheap talk \| Forecasting contest \| Herding \| Exaggeration \| Bias \| Herdenverhalten \| Prognoseverfahren \| Forecasting model \| Systematischer Fehler \| Wissenschaftler \| Scientists \| Theorie \| Theory

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/B978-0-444-62731-5.00012-9 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025236