Chapter 3 : Reciprocal Altruism, Norms, and Evolutionary Game Theory

This chapter critically analyses contributions to evolutionary game theory by such writers as Robert Trivers, John Maynard-Smith, and Robert Axelrod. It develops four key arguments. First, that the behavioral propensities that manifest themselves in altruistic behavior are empirically relevant, extend to behavior to non-kin, and should be understood to include the passive altruism reflected in failure to harm. Second, that an evolutionary approach emphasizing group or multilevel selection provides a coherent framework for understanding how such traits might have become established in populations, and that existing “explanations” for such behavior do not. Third, that economic models are not necessarily the same as evolutionary models in their implications. In particular, the justification by appeal to evolutionary theory for the standard economic behavioral assumptions is invalid. Finally, that attempts to account for the origin of altruistic behavioral propensities toward non-kin through evolutionary models restricted to individual level selection or, what turns out to be the equivalent, economic models where agents efficiently pursue their own individual self interest, represent journeys down similar intellectual cul-de-sacs