Purpose The purpose of this study is to define the interactions that determine how secure a society is from terrorism and to propose a method for measuring the threat of terrorism in an objective and spatio-temporally comparable manner. Methodology/approach Game-theoretic analysis of the determinants of security and discussion of how to implement these interactions into a measure of security. Findings We show that governments concerned with popularity have an incentive to over-invest in security and that, in certain situations, this leads to a deterioration in net security position. Our discussion provides an implementable means for measuring the levels of threat and protection, as well as individuals’ perceptions of both, which we propose can be combined into an objective and scientific measure of security. Research limitations/implications The implication for researchers is the suggestion that efficiency, as well as scale of counter-terrorism, is important in determining a country’s overall security position. Furthermore, we suggest that individuals’ perceptions are at least as important in determining suitable counter-terrorism policy as objective measures of protection and threat. The limitations of this research are found in the vast data requirements that any attempt to measure security will need. Originality/value of the chapter We propose the first method for objectively measuring the net security position of a country, using economic and econometric means.
