Characterization of the Weak Core of Simple Games with Infinitely Many Alternatives

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018) still holds true even when the set of alternatives contains uncountably infinite elements

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Yu, Chaowen
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Core \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Koalition \| Coalition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 7, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3225500 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913496