Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting

We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 691-717
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Repeated games \| unequal discounting \| imperfect monitoring \| folk theorem

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1425 [DOI] 893525073 [GVK] hdl:10419/150260 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1425 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599551