Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting

Takuo Sugaya

We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.

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Year of publication:	September 2015
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 691-717
Subject:	Repeated games \| unequal discounting \| imperfect monitoring \| folk theorem \| Diskontierung \| Discounting \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Folk-Theorem \| Folk theorem \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1425 [DOI] hdl:10419/150260 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673281