Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting

We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-01
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - 2014
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Repeated games \| unequal discounting \| imperfect monitoring \| folk theorem

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019207