Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ishida, Junichiro ; Shimizu, Takashi |
| Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 68.2019, 2, p. 303-334
|
| Subject: | Cheap talk | Higher-order uncertainty | Informed receiver | Strategic communication | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Risiko | Risk | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Information | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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