Cheating Alone and in Teams

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analyzed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Dilger, Alexander
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Betrug \| Fraud \| Theorie \| Theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Kollektives Handeln \| Collective action

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Series:	Discussion Paper of the Institute for Organisational Economics 1/2021
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3821614 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; z20 ; z22
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232385