Cleaning Up the Water Law of British Columbia : A Problemistic Approach to Rule Changes

Most models of institutional change (e.g.,Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002) rely on the presence of powerful agents intent on changing the institutions. Few institutional change studies concern situations where powerful agents are absent or do not pursue change. In this paper, we argue that institutional change is also driven, at least in part, by the problems that institutional rules experience. Thus, this research departs from prior studies on institutional rules in three ways. First, we move our analysis to the level of institutional rules. Second, we broaden the focus to include a range of rules, regardless of the attention they receive from powerful interests. Third, we approach institutional rule change from a ‘problemistic’ (i.e., problem-oriented) perspective, building on Carnegie models that stress the role of problems in organizational search and adaptation (Cyert and March, 1963; Jennings , Schulz, Patient, Gravel, Yuan, 2005). In particular, we explore three problem-related mechanisms: problem attraction, problem recognition, and problem engagement