Cover Image

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
Year of publication:
2007
Authors: Ansink, Erik ; Ruijs, Arjan
Publisher: Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject: Klimaveränderung | Spieltheorie | Wasserversorgung | Water Allocation | Stability | Climate Change | Game Theory
Full text |
Series:
Nota di Lavoro ; 16.2007
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories): Working Paper
Language: English
Other identifiers:
546300200 [GVK]
hdl:10419/73974 [Handle]
RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.16 [RePEc]
Classification: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Q25 - Water
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312326
Similar items by subject
Similar items by person