Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Dimitrov, Dinko ; Haake, Claus-Jochen
Publisher:	Universität Bielefeld
Subject:	Paradox of smaller coalitions \| Coalition formation \| Semistrict core \| Simple games \| Winning coalitions

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Type of publication:	Other
Language:	English
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452523