Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core

We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the per capita nucleolus is not monotonic.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Arin, J. ; Feltkamp, V.
Published in:	European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 216.2012, 1, p. 208-213
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Monotonicity \| Core \| TU games \| Per capita nucleolus

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574200