Cognitive Uncertainty in Games - A Note on Limited Information Processing and Backward Induction

A notion of cognitive uncertainty is introduced as an agent's uncertainty about the validity of the results of his own information processing. In order to analyze this notion, a formal model of the agent's information processing is presented. It is shown how cognitive uncertainty may prevent a group of well informed rational agents from playing backward induction in a game of perfect information, whereas they would play backward induction without such uncertainty.

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Year of publication:	2000-04-27
Authors:	Clausing, Thorsten
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	uncertainty \| information processing \| backward induction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118647