Collusion and renegotiation in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
The Scandinavian journal of economics. - Oxford : Wiley, ISSN 0347-0520, ZDB-ID 8170-X. - Vol. 99.1997, 4, p. 497-518
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Korruption | Corruption | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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