Collusion in bertrand vs. cournot competition : a virtual bargaining approach
| Year of publication: |
December 2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Melkonyan, Tigran A. ; Zeitoun, Hossam ; Chater, Nick |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 12, p. 5599-5609
|
| Subject: | virtual bargaining | collusion | games-group decisions | Bertrand paradox | Duopol | Duopoly | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Kartell | Cartel | Virtuelle Organisation | Virtual organization |
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