Collusion, shading and optimal organization design in a three-tier agency model with a continuum of types
Yutaka Suzuki
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Suzuki, Yutaka |
| Published in: |
Annals of economics and finance. - Beijing : Peking University Press, ISSN 1529-7373, ZDB-ID 2097904-6. - Vol. 22.2021, 2, p. 317-365
|
| Subject: | collusion | supervision | mechanism design | First Order (Mirrlees) Approach | behavioral economics | shading | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013350850