Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ciarreta, Aitor ; Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
Published in:	Estudios de Economía. - Santiago de Chile : Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, ISSN 0718-5286. - Vol. 40.2013, 2, p. 247-254
Publisher:	Santiago de Chile : Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
Subject:	optimal punishments \| detection lags \| collusion sustainability

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	775242012 [GVK] hdl:10419/146715 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538750