Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Aitor Ciarreta; Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ciarreta, Aitor ; Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
Published in:	Estudios de economía. - Santiago : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0718-5286, ZDB-ID 2162059-3. - Vol. 40.2013, 2, p. 247-254
Subject:	Optimal punishments \| detection lags \| collusion sustainability \| Strafe \| Punishment \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Notes:	Paralleltitel: Sostenimiento de colusión con castigos óptimos y retrasos en la detección, con una aplicación al juego de Cournot
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/146715 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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