Collusions in Chinese family firms : an informal institution-based view of multiple large shareholders
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Lv, Huaili ; Li, Wanli |
Published in: |
The journal of applied business research. - Littleton, Colo. : CIBER Research Inst., ISSN 0892-7626, ZDB-ID 1107555-7. - Vol. 31.2015, 4, p. 1531-1548
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Subject: | Formal Institution | Informal Institution | Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS) | Collusions | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | China | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Theorie | Theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
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