Combining the endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the contents of strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly
Yasuhiko Nakamura
| Year of publication: |
2019
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
| Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 59.2019, p. 207-233
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| Subject: | Bertrand competition | Cournot competition | Endogenous timing of incentive parameters | Managerial delegation | Mixed duopoly | Duopol | Duopoly | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.iref.2018.08.020 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202513