Commitment in Procurement Contracting.
Limited commitment causes inefficient production and source selecti on in a multistage procurement process wherein the contractor has privat e information about uncertain costs. A contractor's limited liability l eads a monopsonist to rely more on quantity distortions to extract rents. Moreover, sequential contracting makes it difficult for the buyer to identify the most efficient supplier. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Riordan, Michael H ; Sappington, David E M |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 90.1988, 3, p. 357-72
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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