Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Englmaier, Florian |
Published in: |
Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 0143-6570, ZDB-ID 582227-0. - Vol. 32.2011, 1, p. 63-69
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Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Persönlichkeitspsychologie | Personality psychology | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game |
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