Commitment or Rent-Seeking? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for ESG Reporting in Sustainable E-Commerce Logistics

Authenticity of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) reports for E-commerce logistics service providers (ELSPs) is crucial to ensure the transparency and accuracy in reporting on sustainability practices. As logistics activities have a significant impact on the environment and society, stakeholders need to have reliable information on their ESG practices. However, the behavior strategies of ESG rating stakeholders can have an impact on the accuracy and authenticity of ESG reports. Analytical analysis and incentive policies need to be developed to prevent the rent-seeking behavior due to the potential collusion among the ESLPs and ESG rating agencies (ERAs). This paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore long-term decision-making behaviors and stable strategies of three stakeholders in the E-commerce logistics industry, including ELSPs, ERAs, and government regulators. Evolutionary stable strategies and conditions are then derived to capture the feature of incentive policies. The governance mechanisms, such as the imposition of penalties, are discussed to facilitate ESLPs providing the ESG commitment transportation services. Finally, analytical sensitivity analysis is performed to validate the association of the factors that influence stable strategies. The results indicate that incentive policies can effectively encourage ESLPs to provide commitment ESG transportation services in the early stage. In the long term, the government's penalty policy will help deter ESG counterfeiting in the marketplace