Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if the relative bargaining position changes substantially

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Amann, Erwin ; Leonhardt, Nadine
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Krieg \| War \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Politischer Konflikt \| Political conflict

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 1, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2221326 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160801