Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance
Consumers who believe that government will provide them with some public medical care, even if they did not purchase medical insurance, may choose to purchase no such insurance. The amount of medical care consumed will then be less than the first-best optimum. Under specified conditions government can then increase the welfare of consumers by subsidizing insurance, or by providing public health care at a more generous level than the minimum it would otherwise give. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1992) 17, 137–145. doi:10.1007/BF00962710
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Glazer, Amihai ; Niskanen, Esko |
Published in: |
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X. - Vol. 17.1992, 2, p. 137-145
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
Saved in:
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