Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model
Year of publication: |
1990-07
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
Subject: | Bargaining | Commitment | Repeated Games | Reputation |
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