Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy.

We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principals'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to construct a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests acan lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum taxes or transfers.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Dexit, A. ; Grossman, G.M. ; Helpman, E.
Institutions:	Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Subject:	INFORMATION \| ECONOMIC MODELS

More details

Series:	Tel Aviv.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	31 pages
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675349