Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge

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Year of publication:	2019 ; This Version: April 26, 2019
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo ; Yamamoto, Yuichi
Publisher:	[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business]
Subject:	repeated game \| private monitoring \| incomplete information \| ex-post equilibrium \| individual learning \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 125 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper. - Rochester, NY : Social Science Electronic Publishing, ZDB-ID 2865911-9. - Vol. no. 19, 25] PIER Working Paper ; No. 19-008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3385516 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065313