Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo ; Yamamoto, Yuichi
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 15.2020, 3, p. 1175-1219
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Repeated game \| private monitoring \| incomplete information \| ex-post equilibrium \| individual learning

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE3820 [DOI] 1738540596 [GVK] hdl:10419/253494 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:3820 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189044