Communication and authority with a partially informed expert
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Agastya, Murali ; Bag, Parimal Kanti ; Chakraborty, Indranil |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 45.2014, 1, p. 176-197
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Subject: | sender-receiver game | Carwford-Sobel model | strategic information transmission under uncertainty | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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