Communication and efficiency in auctions

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kos, Nenad
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 1, p. 233-249
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Mechanism design \| Message space \| Communication complexity

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573658