Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Heller, Yuval ; Solan, Eilon ; Tomala, Tristan
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 74.2012, 1, p. 222-234
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Cheap-talk \| Communication equilibrium \| Normal-form correlated equilibrium \| Distributed computation

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010597544