Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.

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Year of publication:	2000-02-15
Authors:	Volij, Oscar
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2000, 1, p. 63-79
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Asymmetric information \| core \| common knowledge

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: September 1998/revised version: June 1999
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178855