Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 547-586
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Generalized median voting schemes | strategy-proofness | anonymity |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1910 [DOI] 893329088 [GVK] hdl:10419/150286 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1910 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
-
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo, (2014)
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Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo, (2014)
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Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
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