Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare
Year of publication: |
2011-04
|
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Authors: | Troyan, Peter |
Institutions: | Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University |
Subject: | school choice | Boston mechanism | deferred acceptance | market design | weak priorities |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 10-021 |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; I20 - Education. General |
Source: |
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Chen, Yan, (2013)
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Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
Troyan, Peter, (2012)
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School Choice : Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
Jaramillo, Paula, (2017)
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Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
Troyan, Peter, (2012)
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Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
Troyan, Peter, (2017)
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(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
Troyan, Peter, (2024)
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