Competing Mechanisms Communication under Exclusivity Clauses

In the present note, we show that a weak restriction on out of equilibrium beliefs allows to extend the Revelation Principle to exclusive agency games, even if we consider mixed strategy equilibria. Next, we argue that this result does not extend to games with several agents, even if we restrict the analysis to pure strategy equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2014-01-06
Authors:	Attar, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Piaser, Gwenaël
Institutions:	Institut de Préparation à l'Administration et à la Gestion (IPAG)
Subject:	Competing Mechanisms \| Exclusive Contracts \| Incomplete Information \| Participation decision

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2014-048 19 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010754751