Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent.

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Year of publication:	2011-06-30
Authors:	Attar, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Piaser, Gwenael
Institutions:	Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la Sviluppo (CEIS), Facoltà di Economia
Subject:	Competing Mechanisms \| Exclusivity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEIS Research Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 201 16 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150957