Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Attar, Andrea
Other Persons:	Campioni, Eloisa (contributor) ; Piaser, Gwenael (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Series:	CEIS Working Paper ; No. 201
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 5, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1879123 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067730