Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment

This document analyses collusion by innovative firms and the role of patents in a continuous-time real options framework. A patent-investment race model is formulated in which innovative firms bargain and reach collusive agreements. It is shown that, while collusion always delays innovation, it does not necessarily delay competition. Depending on a number of factors, collusion can actually accelerate competition.

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Year of publication:	2005-07
Authors:	Breccia, Adriana ; Banda, Héctor Salgado
Institutions:	Banco de México
Subject:	Bargaining \| Collusion \| Competition \| Geometric Brownian motion \| Nash axiomatic approach \| Stackelberg game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2005-04
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004967940