Competition and Collusion with Fixed Output

In many industries, output is fixed by exogenous constraints, so firms compete by allocating a given stock of supplies between different markets. This paper shows that collusion in such industries leads firms to shift output from high-margin markets to low-margin markets. As a result, welfare is generally reduced although prices decrease in some markets and increase in others

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Zenger, Hans
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Preiskartell \| Price-fixing cartel \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 120, No. 2, pp. 259-261, 2013 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 6, 2013 erstellt
Classification:	L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083114