Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game

We show that in a preemption game of entry into a Cournot market, increasing the number of competitors beyond duopoly does not bring forward the time of first entry. We also show that all entries, except the first one, occur earlier than socially optimal.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Argenziano, Rossella ; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 3, p. 509-512
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Timing games \| Preemption \| Dynamic entry

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681752