Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions

We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy's complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Sherstyuk, Katerina
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 31.2011, 4, p. 2769-2776
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	ascending auctions \| complexity \| finite automata \| experimental evidence

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321774