Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy

This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Choe, Chongwoo ; Fraser, Iain
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe Business School
Subject:	Information \| Environmental Management EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1997.08 22 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867779