Comprehensive Rationalizability

We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Schipper, Burkhard C. ; Meier, Martin ; Heifetz, Aviad
Publisher:	Davis, CA : University of California, Department of Economics
Subject:	Common assumption of rationality \| common belief in rationality \| iterated admissibility \| rationalizability \| lexicographic belief systems

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Series:	Working Paper ; 17-4
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1009644858 [GVK] hdl:10419/187494 [Handle] RePEc:cda:wpaper:17-4 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936490