Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance
ln the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | VILLENEUVE, Bertrand |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2003, 69, p. 119-142
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
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