Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berga Colom, Dolors ; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe ; Moreno, Bernardo |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 181.2019, p. 199-202
|
Subject: | Condorcet winner | Scoring rule | Semiplurality rule | Single-peakedness | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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