Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters vote informatively. We prove that with three alternatives, there are cases in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Goertz, Johanna M.M. ; Maniquet, François
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 25-28
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Condorcet Jury Theorem \| Information aggregation \| Large Poisson games

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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