Consistency and communication in committees
Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar, Mark T. Le Quement (Institute of Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Germany)
| Year of publication: |
December 2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Deimen, Inga ; Ketelaar, Felix ; Thordal-Le Quement, Mark |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 160.2015, p. 24-35
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| Subject: | Committees | Voting | Information aggregation | Cheap talk | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549329